LESSON OF HISTORY: BATTLE OF MALAYA, 8 DECEMBER 1941 TO 1 FEBRUARY 1942

Introduction

1. 80 years ago, on the 1^st February 1942, the last British unit from the 2^nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders crossed the Johore Straits via the causeway with full military tradition blowing bagpipes to the tunes of ‘Hielan Laddie’ albeit with only two pipers survived the Battle of Malaya. It was an incredible act of defiance trying to uphold the honour and prestige of the British Empire. At the same time, the Royal Engineers blew the causeway, which left a large gap to decommission the roadways in a desperate effort to halt the rapid Japanese blitzkrieg to Singapore. Before that, it was less than 60 days for the British forces from a variety of their dominions, including the native Malays, which had fought the battles throughout the Malayan peninsular with little effect. The loss of Malaya on the 1^st February 1942 marks the start of the Battle of Singapore, which in its conclusion would have an ensuing long-lasting psychological effect on the myth of the British invincibility among the Empire’s subjects and also marked the beginning of the end of the British rule in Malaya itself.

 

2. The rapid advance of the 25^th Army led by Lt. General Tomoyuki Yamashita could be seen as pure luck in military tactics from the overall perspectives of an offensive attack (since most of the battle was fought in northern Malaya was carried out through a frontal attack). Still, most of the successes achieved were also contributed through superior technological advantages such as the deployment of tanks by the Japanese while the British had none. The invading Japanese forces were also assisted with the state of the art combat aircraft compared to the British deployed aircraft for its air defence which was not only less in numbers (215 worthy air aircrafts against 400 Japanese planes consisting of both fighter and bomber) but was also comparatively low in terms of its technological capability that proved useless for the Malayan aerial defence every time they went head to head in combat with Japan over Malaya from December 1941 to February 1942. Surely military students and historians would not forget the image of Lt. Gen. Yamashita banging the table at the Ford Factory in Singapore on the 15^th February 1942, trying to press and intimidate Lt. General A.E. Percival for unconditional surrender while the Japanese forces that were embarked for the Singapore campaign were less in numbers compared to the defending British forces on that island. That being said, the Battle of Malaya/ Singapore continues to offer us today a good significant lesson that can be learned and studied for a better understanding of what truly transpired over the 75 days of the Japanese tactics and strategies not only from the historical perspectives of the battles fought but also military tactics and leadership decision before and during the Malayan campaign which led to the most extraordinary capitulation of the British military occurred at the impregnable Singapore fortress in 1942. This lesson is imperative, especially for Malaysian of today, in particular, to understand and avoid a similar tragedy to reoccur in the future should there be a need for the nation to defend itself from any conventional military threat since the doctrine and tactics of a modern war would not significantly change since 1942.

 

3. In the overall context of the local Malaysian history books, the Battle of Malaya, 1942, was only covered to a much lesser extent with battles and skirmishes that were inaccurately depicted in school textbooks. One of the examples was that the Japanese military advance down the peninsular Malaya was an easy victory against the British by mainly using bicycles. This was far from the truth, and this inaccurate understanding left an unwanted impression towards the present Malaysian citizens of the unimportance for a military modernisation program such as the need for a formidable mechanised unit, especially the Main Battle Tank (MBT) for the Malaysian Army in facing the threat of war today. The prevailing truth that Malaysian themselves are not probably aware of or hasn’t learned in deeper understanding that the victory of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) during their Malayan campaign in 1942 was contributed by several significant factors such as:

• The Japanese three-pronged advance from Singgora, Pattani and Kota Bharu down the peninsular was spearheaded and assisted by 200 tanks while the British defenders had none at all;
• The British High Command in Malaya/ Singapore was not supplied with enough fighter and bomber aircrafts. The deployed RAF, RNZF and RAAF squadrons that were stationed in Malaya in 1941-42 were equipped with an outdated type of fighter, and bomber planes with the likes of Brewster Buffaloes, Bristol Bleinheim, Vickers Vildebeest, or Hudson Bombers compared to the state of the art A6M Mitsubishi Zero and Nakajima Ki-48 (to name a few) which were more agile, longer range of distance and manoeuvrable compared to the British aircrafts. In just two days of fighting, the numbers of the British planes dropped significantly (threefold) after being destroyed by the enemy;
• The British troops that were deployed to Malaya in 1941 did not undergo rigorous jungle training before the war, and most of the units that were sent there were diverted from the Middle East theatre compared to the IJA that were veterans from the war in China and went through prior training for the Malayan attack in Hainan Island. Most of the troops and armoured carriers used by the British defenders in Malaya were painted yellow, a glaring colour for desert warfare in the green jungle conditions which resulted in them being an easy target from the air; and
• The extreme failure of the leadership quality among the British generals that were stationed in Malaya not only led to confusion, panic and horrible decision but the sheer unpreparedness for a defensive line to be truly prepared and defended. However, on a particular occasion, the terrain in Malaya would offer them a significant advantage in terms of high ground, bottleneck funnel roadways and rainforest concealment with a few examples such as the geographical location of Gurun, Kampar, Slim River and Gemas area in 1941/42.

 

The use of tanks by the IJA in the Malayan campaign

4. Perhaps one of the most misleading historical facts taught and stressed out to the school children in Malaysia today was that the Japanese advance during the Malaya campaign was contributed primarily by the pervasive use of bicycles as a mode of troop transportation. Although this was notably true to some extent, the fact that the piercing attack allowed for the Japanese troops to safely march on the bicycles apart from hundreds of armoured carriers and thousands of trucks from their Siam’s beachheads to Johore Baharu was primarily made possible through their tank regiments. During the Malayan campaign, the IJA deployed around 200 tanks from the Type 95, Type 97 and Type 89 while the defending British forces had none. Although the British forces actually had anti-tank weapons such as the two pounders anti-tank gun, hand-carried Boys anti-tank rifles and a number of occasions the 25 pounder artillery gun that can be turned into an anti-tank gun, this is an odd defensive possibility which the guns operators were put into a highly vulnerable position against a tank attack. On specific occasions in Trolak and Slim River, 7 January 1942, the defending forces from the Hyderabad and Gurkha battalions had to use a Molotov cocktail to attack a Japanese tank.

 

5. The British government in the year 1939 leading up to the year 1940s were obliged to supply the Russian government with thousands of Valentines and Matilda tanks for the Soviets to continue their war effort with Nazi Germany, and none of the much-needed tanks was even considered to be deployed to Malaya. This was an odd decision despite the great conditions of the Malayan roadways developed by the British themselves from the 1920s to 1930s throughout the peninsular to transport tin and rubber commodities to Singapore. None of the possibility of tank warfare was even considered by any British generals despite the broader range and modern trunk road conditions leading to Singapore. To a lesser degree of mitigating any impending risk, the British government decided perhaps it was best for an elite unit such as the 2^nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to be equipped with the Lancaster armoured carrier and the Australian 8^th Division also to be equipped with Marmon-Herrington armoured cars. Still, the tactics and strategy involving the tank and armoured vehicles are two different things in combat that prove to be too wide of a technological gap for the British to deal with, as was witnessed throughout the Malayan campaign from their experience defending a position against a tank attack in Jitra, Gurun, Kampar, Slim River to Muar in 1941-42.

 

6. Perhaps the most significant victory of the IJA by using tanks against not only from a numerical superior of the British defenders compounded by a well prepared great defensive position was observed during the Battle of Kampar from 30 December 1941 to 2 January 1942 and the Battle of Slim River on the 7 January 1942. Not only that the IJA manage to penetrate the defensive line quicker than what was expected, but in Slim River itself, where only 9 of the Japanese light and medium tanks were used to pierce an attack in just within 6 hours which managed to route around 6,000 of British soldiers as Prisoner of War (PoW) while confiscating much of the British supplies in the form of hundreds of trucks, armoured carriers (that were used later by the IJA themselves), anti-aircrafts guns and much-needed wireless set that proved to be desperately needed for the ensuing battle in Johor which led to more defeats of the British units. In both battles in Kampar and Slim River, the 2^nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had to improvise the use of the Lancaster armoured cars as the bastion of its defence position such as the bulwark of the bridgehead with little effect against a Japanese tank attack. The loss of the Battle of Slim River was seen as the worst defeat of the British forces during the Battle of Malaya and Singapore itself, of which this tragedy can be averted with just a couple of Matilda tanks if they were ever deployed by the British to Malaya in 1941.

 

Japanese completed air superiority over Malaya in 1942

7. Another significant aspect of the sheer weaknesses of the British defenders during the Battle of Malaya in 1942 was the stark insufficient numbers of formidable aircraft that could match any of the Japanese Navy land-based aircrafts that provided covers for the landings Singgora, Pattani and Kota Bharu. Although the RAAF that was stationed at Kota Bharu on the 8^th December 1941 managed to perform a commendable act by launching the only few Lockheed Hudson bombers that were stationed in Kota Bharu airfield against the Takumi Detachment landing at Pantai Sabak, the small success of the RAAF in sinking one transport ship and damaged two but still could not stop the Japanese 18^th Division from successfully established a beachhead in Kota Bharu and subsequently took the nearby airport from the British. The gallantry episode of the RAAF was emulated later by the sole bombing mission of Squadron Leader Arthur Scarf VC from the destroyed Butterworth airfield on the morning of 10 December 1941 to bomb the Japanese landing in Singgora, which he did not survive upon crash-landed in Alor Setar. A few notable sheer wills and high spirited air force crew under the British command were commendable. Still, they proved futile against a technological and numerical superiority of the Japanese aircraft deployed in the Malayan campaign. During the Battle of Endau, 27 January 1942, there was an occasion wherein a desperate attempt, the British even used the outdated biplane Vickers Vildebeest in the torpedo attack of a transport ship of which the plane was shot down after a swarm of attack from Nakajima Ki-27 and Ki-44 fighter.

 

8. Perhaps the pinnacle effect of the unconcerned decision before the war by the British command in Malaya on the importance of the air defence resulted in the loss of the crown jewel of the Royal Navy, i.e. the Prince of Wales battleship and battlecruiser Repulse off the Kuantan Coast when both ships under the Force Z taskforce was deployed to interrupt further landings of the IJA at the east coast of Malaya without any air cover. The sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse changed the whole spectrum of the world’s naval warfare doctrine where thence on battleship was no longer considered the flagship of any of the navy task forces. Still, it merely used to provide covers for the aircrafts carrier instead. The psychological effect of the sinking of the Prince of Wales battleship and Repulse battlecruiser further demoralised the spirit of the defending British forces in Malaya. It debunked on the need and theory of the whole Malayan tactics for the Sembawang dry dock to be defended. Even the Malay natives started to have doubts over their British colonial master’s invincibility with the defeat of the Royal Navy at the start of the war. By the middle of January 1942, it was witnessed that the Japanese army and navy planes that now was already land stationed in Alor Setar, Kota Bharu and Kuantan were effectively used to bomb the British garrison along the Mersing line (Batu Pahat, Muar, and Gemas) which contributed to further defeats and loss among the British officers which prompt them further for a hurried retreat to Singapore. The air domination of the Japanese forces in the middle of January 1942 over Malaya and Singapore was absolute and complete when the British High command decided it was best for them to relocate their remaining fighter and bomber planes to Sumatera and Java Islands despite the late introduction of Hawkers Hurricanes fighter aircrafts late January 1942 that could match the Japanese aircrafts although it was too little too late.

 

Lack of jungle warfare ability among the British forces in Malaya, 1942

10.  The Battle of Malaya also witnessed the stark gap of the jungle fighting ability among the British units compared to the Japanese soldiers. The lack of proper jungle training and sheer lack of local terrain understanding put the British units at a disadvantage. Some of the units even went through a short period to get acclimatised with the Malayan tropics after disembarking at Singapore harbour only weeks before being entrained straight into combat to the north of Malaya. This can be observed through the tragedy of the complete annihilation of the 45^thIndian Brigade in Muar on the 14th January 1942 when the formation was put under the command of the Australian 8^th Division to protect their left flank. The 45^th Indian Brigade were not only just recently been recruited in India with a short span of training but were directly sent to go against one of the most elite units of the Japanese 25^th Army – the Imperial Guards Division. Compounded by incessant bombing from the air, which resulted in the loss of many high-rank officers, the fall of the 45^th Indian Brigade defensive line around the Muar river estuaries would allow for the Japanese 5^th Division to later use the river crossing to transport its tanks and troops for further attack on the Australian position around Bakri – Parit Sulong with much ease. Lt. Gen. A.E. Percival best depicted the tragedy that ensued with the loss of the Battle of Muar in his memoir after the war, which read as such:

 

“The young Indian recruits were helpless. They did not even know how to take cover, and there were not enough officers to control them. I say this in no spirit of disparagement. It was the penalty of years of unpreparedness for war coming out for its stark nakedness.” – Lt. Gen. A.E. Percival.

 

11. Another example of the lack of local terrain understanding by the British unit deployed during the Malayan campaign was the tragedy of the complete annihilation of the 22^nd Indian Brigade, including the loss of their General Commanding Officer (GOC), Maj Gen Arthur Barstow in Layang-Layang station at Johore. The 22^nd Indian Brigade was a formation that was put under the 9^th Division alongside the 8^th Indian Brigade. Both the 9^th Division and 11^th Division was under the III Indian Corps commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir Lewis Heath for the defence of the Malayan peninsular. Since December 1941, the 9^th Division has been in action from the security of Kota Bharu airfield to the protection of Kuantan airfield before being pulled out to the south of Malaya after the fall of Slim River while the 11th Division has been in action had defended the northern Malaya sector. On the 27^th of January 1942, the 9^th Division mission was to hold and deny the enemy from using a train line and roads to the south of Kluang and Renggam town which to allow other remaining British units retreating from the north of Kluang and from Yong Peng to pull any valuable remaining assets that survived thus far with the likes of troop’s carrier, artillery and mechanised vehicles for the defence of Singapore. What ensued on the 27^th January 1942 was a shemozzle of decisions made by the 8^th Indian Brigade commander, Brig Gen William Ley that was defending a small town in Layang-layang who failed to assess the need to take an elevated ridge overlooking the Layang-layang train station to provide cover for the 22^nd Indian Brigade holding an area further north of the Layang-layang station and his 8^th Brigade HQ. Another blunder was that the shemozzle occurred due to a mistake of a unit under him to blow up a connecting railway bridge before appropriate time between the 8th Brigade and 22nd Brigade, which were holding an area further north of the bridge. The early destruction of the train bridge destroyed only the possible retreating line for the 22^nd Indian Brigade and severed the telegraph wire for communication between both brigades. The situation turned worse when the ridge overlooking the Layang-layang station, which was failed to be taken by the 8^th Indian Brigade, had now been occupied by the enemy, leading to the encirclement of the 22^nd Indian Brigade exploited palm oil roads within the palm oil plantation. This prompted the GOC of the 9^th Division, Maj Gen Arthur Barstow, to probe down the line himself in the early morning of the 28^th January 1942 at the cost of his own life. Maj Gen Arthur Barstow was the highest British commanding officer killed in action during the Malaya and Singapore campaign in 1942. Without a GOC, the entire 9^th Division were without a leader, which led to a panic retreat of the 8^th Indian Brigade that left the encircled 22^nd Indian Brigade north of the Layang-layang station to defend itself. Later, Brig Gen Painter, the commanding officer of the 22^nd Indian Brigade, had to decide to traverse through a thick jungle and left their wounded at the station aid to the mercy of the enemy, eventually reaching north of Johor Bahru too late to join the main bulk of the III Corps (most of the III Corps had crossed the Johor causeway on the 1^st February 1942). Brig Gen Painter had to decide to surrender to the Japanese 25^th Army in Johor Bahru since there was no avenue left for what was the remaining of his brigade (around 600 soldiers from the 5/ 11^th Sikh) to cross the causeway to Singapore. Another incident was the evacuation of the 1,500 soldiers of the 15^th Indian Brigade by HMS Dragonfly and HMS Scorpion from Pantai Punggol in Rengit when the Imperial Japanese Guards Division has encircled them in their southern retreat after the shambolic defeat in Muar and Batu Pahat area on the 28th January 1942. The silver lining perhaps was the success of this evacuation contributed by the local knowledge of the 1st Malay Regiment officers that volunteered to take part in the evacuation mission as pathfinders since some of the men were raised around the Johor area know the local terrain and natives around Pontian.

 

12. The Australian 8^th Division tasked to defend the Gemas, Bakri – Parit Sulong and Simpang Renggam area somehow managed to put up a commendable and gallant fighting act with better execution of jungle tactics such as ambushes and tank attacks. This may be mainly due to the tough mentality among the Australian soldiers who believe that the defence of Malaya would contribute to better protection of Australia itself. The soldiers of the 8^th Division went through better jungle training in the tropics, especially around Mersing before the war, which resulted in them being able to carry out an effective ambush that inflicted heavy casualties to the Japanese 5^th Division, such as when they destroyed a number of enemy tanks in Gemas and Bakri which were seen almost impossible by the 11^th Division (using 2 pounder anti-tank guns and Boys anti-tank rifles) during their effort in defending the northern Malaya. This success of the Australian soldiers at the Gemencheh river ambush on the 14^th January 1942 and the valiant effort by the anti-tank crew around Bakri was well documented in a film by the Army correspondence in destroying enemy tanks by using the 2 pounder anti-tank guns would give the British Malayan Command a glimmer of hope for a possible defence of Johore. However, this hope was destroyed by the flanking manoeuvre of the Japanese units especially involving the Imperial Japanese Guards Division using boats and sampans landing down the west coast around Muar and Batu Pahat river mouth proves too much for the gallant effort of the 8th Australian Division to carry out the effective task to defend Johore if they would be cut off south of their position. Moreover, they were only assisted by the 2 pounder anti-tank guns and heavily modified Marmon-Herrington armoured cars compared to the formidable Japanese light and medium tanks carrying out left and right flanking attacks with non-stop aerial bombings, which were a no match to the brave Australian soldiers.

 

13. Perhaps the list of the only British units that deserved commendation during the duration of the Malayan/ Singapore campaign were from the unit of the 2^nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Gurkha Rifles, Australian 8^th Division, 3/17^th Dogra of the 9^th Division, and the 1^st Malay Regiment (in Singapore). These units were genuinely prepared to go to war physically and mentally in Malaya, which lived up to their expectations in carrying out the defensive task at the high cost of their men.

 

The low leadership quality of the British Generals in Malaya, 1942

14. Apart from the sheer lack of insufficient training and lack of the proper equipment support for the British troops in Malaya/ Singapore, the most significant factor which led to the eventual fall of the Singapore garrison on the 15^th February 1942 was the lack of proper leadership within the British command during the duration of the war campaign in Malaya. The failure to launch the Matador Operation that was supposed to catch the Japanese 25^th Army by the neck during their landings at the southern Thailand beachheads was clearly due to the indecisive part of Lt. General A.E. Percival. Moreover, his ineptness in coming up with a clear plan for the Malaya defence despite the apparent signs of invasion and the idiotic consideration of the farfetched plan of the Matador Operation itself shows the incompetency of the British command in Malaya in 1941. Percival and the British general staff underestimated the Japanese ability for a swift troops movement down the peninsular once they landed in Singgora and Pattani. The lack of military instruction for the Malayan civilians to assist them in preparing trenches and various pillboxes emplacement was a glaring military leadership ineptitude. Percival, by virtue of his gentleman manner, was seen as taking too much advice from Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor of Singapore, by trying to avoid any move that would upset Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkram, the then de facto dictator of Thailand when Thailand was perceived as more of a neutral party during the onset of the war. Marshal Phibun, later in a swift shift of a decision, decided to bandwagon over the winning odds of the Japanese allowing the Japanese to use his country as a launching pad for the invasion of Malaya in exchange for Thailand’s sovereignty. He later was rewarded by the four northern states of Malaya (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu) in 1943 as a gift for assisting the Japanese to take Malaya and Singapore in 1942. Percival, in December 1941, when the situation pressed him to act tough and aggressive after the unopposed Japanese landings in Singgora and Pattani, reluctantly albeit too late launched the Krohcol (Kroh Column) operation that was a mini Matador by sending the 2^nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 12^th Indian Brigade from the 11^th Indian Division that perhaps could exploit the terrain at the ledge area within the Thai territory north of the Kroh town in Betong in their desperate act to halt the Japanese advance to the Malayan border. However, the race to the ledge was lost by the 11^th Indian Division men that were opposed aggressively by the Thai police force in Betong. When they finally reached the ledge area, it was a little too late as it’s already been taken by the Japanese 5^th Division, including a tank company.

 

15. The failure of the British leadership was very stark at the Battle of Kampar, 30 December 1941 to 2 February 1942, where the terrain and the defensive position was seen before the war started by Percival, Lt. Gen. Sir Lewis Heath – III Corps Commander and the Commander in Chief of the American-British-Dutch-Australia Command (ABDACOM) Gen Archibald Wavell as a dream defensive position due to how the terrain offered excellent advantages for the defending forces. However, Kampar was lost within four days instead of the six months expected by Percival and Wavell. The Kampar ridge was so strategic that the British forces could put an observation post anywhere on the ridge looking down the trunk road connecting Gopeng and Slim River – the Federal Route one, the only road the enemy had to take in their southern march to Singapore. The invading enemy had to pass through an area akin to Thermopylae (a road sandwiched by a broad and deep river and a high ground) that can easily be defended even when attacked by an armoured column. However, the ineffectual of the British leadership in Kampar of Maj Gen Murray Lyon, the GOC of the 11^th Indian Division proved ineffective to exploits the advantages offered by the Kampar’s terrain, which led to another successive British loss and resulted in Percival’s decision to dismiss Murray Lyon and replaced him with a field general – Brig Gen Archibald Paris.

 

16. It was duly noted that there was no effort whatsoever from the British forces to counterattack the Japanese advances and retake the lost position for the whole duration of the Malayan campaign. However, the gallant and high leadership quality of Brig Gen Berthold Wells (Billy) Key from the 8^th Indian Brigade under the 9^th Division that was tasked to defend Pantai Sabak in Kota Bharu on the 8^th December 1941 which inflicted heavy casualties on the Takumi Detachment landing there, his excellent track record and the aptest candidate to be appointed as the replacement for Maj Gen Murray Lyon as the next 11^th Division GOC by Percival was seen as controversial as he was commanding an Indian brigade (British India formation) compared to a United Kingdom – British forces/ Anglo origins of the formations under the 11^th Division. This was one of the poor political decisions by Percival that didn’t want the public to see a British Indian general was a better quality than the UK British led generals, which was politically incorrect and could send a wrong signal about the fighting ability of the Anglo-origin soldiers from Britain. Although Brig Gen Billy Key was later tasked to command the 11^th Division after another reverberating defeat in Slim River, Billy Key paid the trust by proving his worth as an effective commander during a rearguard action in Serendah of which his men did put up a good fight against the advancing Japanese forces. However, this was already too late to stamp a much stronger effect on the Malayan defence considering the terrain south of Slim River, a much-levelled ground with good road conditions that can be defiled from many sides compared to the terrain in northern Malaya.

 

17. The failure of the British generals during the Malayan campaign was the “last straw on camel’s back” for the Australian to put their trust further trust to be commanded by British generals for their homeland defence since the debacle of the Gallipoli campaign during World War 1 in 1916. With the fall of Singapore, Australia began to shift its defence policy outlook to cooperate and partner with the Americans from relying on the British. The success of the co-joint operation in New Guinea later in the year 1942 would prove the success of such a partnership, and they never looked back ever since. The Australians even supported the American Indochina campaign in Vietnam in 1965 by sending several Australian military advisors and more than 7,000 fighting men to support the South Vietnamese government and American backed democracy while the British decided not to take any part of the war effort. This was a clear direction of a new policy shift, of which Australia learned the hard way by subjecting their men under the British command in Malaya/ Singapore, 1942. The British generals’ leadership was ineffective and self-defeating during the Malayan campaign eventually resulted in the men of the 8th Australian Division being incarcerated as PoW. Many perished while building the death railway track in Thailand, inhumanly treated in Sandakan PoW’s camp. Many were also sent to various sites of Japanese labour camps throughout Japan.

 

18. At the end of January 1942, Maj Gen Gordon Bennet, the GOC for the Australian 8^th Division, went to meet with his best friend the Sultan Sir Ibrahim of Johore to wish him goodbye and express his desire to find a way to evacuate himself out of Singapore if Lt. Gen. A.E. Percival ever decided to surrender to the Japanese. The failure of the British general to provide better leadership for the Commonwealth forces had put the Australian soldiers in a sad, despondent and perplexed state of mind when they had been beaten off so decisively and so easily come 15^th February 1942.

 

19. Overall, even before the Japanese landing in Southern Thailand and Kota Bharu on the 8^th December 1941, the British military strategist failed to grasp the main bulk of the Japanese military tactics and failed to anticipate the move made by Japan despite the evidence such as below:

• The high probability for the war to occur in 1941 when the Japanese military government had been pressing for the French Indo-China Vichy government to allow them to build an airstrip and establish a military-based as a launching pad for the invasion of Malaya and Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew recalled when the first bombing of Singapore was carried out on 8th December 1941. The neon lights of the Singapore city were blaring alight, and the city residents’ everyday business was as usual. This showed how unserious the British government was about the possibility of the outbreak of war in 1941;
• The failure of the British military command to expect and anticipate the exact location of the Japanese landings (three successful pronged attacks from established beachheads in Singgora, Pattani and Kota Bharu) not only picked up at worst of timing for a troop’s landings due to the monsoon seasons but the high chances of success for the Japanese to occupy those beachheads (the British Command was expecting a direct attack and landing east of Singapore island). The men of the 9^th Indian Division, just a battalion strength on the 8^th December 1941, was stretched thin from Kota Bharu to the Kuala Besut area. These mistakes continue to occur with the diversion landing of the Japanese detachment in the Endau-Rompin area and subsequently the failure for the British command to anticipate a much probable site for the attack of Singapore island when Yamashita chose Sarimbun beach to land his troops instead of the Woodland-Changi and Punggol beach (with decoy movement at night to confuse the British) which resulted for the British Command to focus their strong presence at the wrong side of the island and leaving Sarimbun vulnerable to be quickly taken;
• The starkest failure for the British military strategist was not being able to anticipate the use of tanks by the invading Japanese forces in Malaya despite good road conditions for tank warfare while not equipping themselves with even one tank. A further bad decision compounded this in not supplying the defence of Malaya with the correct number of aircrafts. Before the war, many of the rubber and palm oil plantations in Johor were owned by a Japanese company. Through this, the Japanese government rotated their military officers disguised as plantation managers to survey and study the terrain in Johor to benefit from the Japanese invasion later in Malaya. Hence the Japanese tanks were used to the fullest during the battle in Johor states that resulted in the resounding Japanese victory;
• Failure to anticipate the landings tactics of the Imperial Guards Division by using boats and sampan to outflank the British position in the northern Malaya defensive line was witnessed in Telok Anson, Kuala Selangor, Batu Pahat and Muar area, which resulted in the encirclement of the British position that subjected them to further defeat by being cut off and encircled by the enemy through roadblocks and ambush sites while retreating to the British line;
• There was not even an effort by the British command to carry out a large scale evacuation operation similar to Dunkirk (1940) for the British troops stuck south of Singapore before the final capitulation on the 15^th February 1942. The evacuation of the British troops from Singapore, if carried out, would avert the greatest capitulation in British military history and avoid the unnecessarily cruel treatment endured by the British PoW; hence would allow them to be able to fight another day considering some of the British units just arrived in Singapore in January 1942 before the surrender (44^th, 45^th Indian Brigade and 18^th Infantry Division);
• The British command failed to know their strength by putting the suitable British units and its formation for the defence of Malaya. Looking back, the decision for the British command to send natives soldiers from the 1^st Malay Regiment to defend Singapore instead of northern Malaya was seen as a wrong one. Considering most of the Malay soldiers came from the peninsular instead of Singapore, they were even trained in Port Dickson. The deployment of the 1^st Malay Regiment and the Australian 8^th Division at the northern Malaya sector could offer a better outcome than the one been decided by the British High Command in 1941-42. The Japanese 25^th Army was even surprised that specific strategic location was not even defended, such as the Krian river area;
• The fallacy of the tactics to pull the III Corps out of Johore to Singapore when the Singapore defence strategy was to protect the Sembawang dry dock from any vulnerability of an attack. By removing the III Corps out of Johor, the Sembawang dry dock was deemed useless, for it would be within the distance of a machine gun and artillery fire from the Johor Bahru area. The loss of Johor pre-ordained the fall of Singapore. Moreover, the bombing of the Johor straits causeway on the 1^st February 1942 also destroyed the vital water pipeline to Singapore that was then filled with 4 million civilian refugees, which put the island almost impossible for a prolonged defence against the enemy; and
• The incomprehensible tactics of the total war concept introduced by the Japanese military strategist Colonel Masanobu Tsuji imprint a fearful belief among the British soldiers for the further war effort to defend Singapore. Maj Cyril Wild, the adjutant for Lt. Gen. Percival, upon his observation of the IJA’s preparation and overall Japanese soldier’s tenacity and spirits along the Bukit Timah road on their way to meet Lt. Gen. Yamashita at the Ford Factory where Cyril firmly believed that if the war were prolonged, the innocent civilians of Singapore would be subjected to cruelty and inhumane act of the Japanese soldiers similar to what was witnessed in Nanking, 1937. This was backed up by the incessant bombing of Penang during the Japanese thrust at northern Malaya in December 1941, which resulted in the death of a staggering 5,000 civilians as a reminder of the British ever attempted to hold the island.

 

Conclusion

20. What can we learn from the history lesson derived from the Battle of Malaya fought 80 years ago on Malaysian soil? First and foremost, Malaysian military strategists and policymakers from the Ministry of Defence need to pay attention and heed to the need for change for the Armed Forces modernisation program taking examples of the factors which contributed to the loss of the Malayan garrison in 1942 since the modern military tactics on conventional warfare doesn’t significantly change. There were so many lessons, reminders, and salient points from the British defeat in 1942 that still resonates and should not be repeated. Herewith are a list of things that should be notably taken into action by the modern Malaysian military strategist, taking consideration of the comparative studies on the contemporary warfare strategy derives from the fall of Singapore, 1942:

• For the Malaysian Army to take very seriously the need to have the right capability incognizant of the Malaysian environment, especially regarding the procurement of Main Battle Tank (MBT) in defence of modern Malaysia. Today Malaysian Army has an inventory of around 50 MBT from the PT91M model – Pendekar version of which was made in Poland at the early turn of the millennia. The numerical strength of these tanks is dwarfed by the need to defend today’s vast Malaysian modern road considering the excellent modern road and bridge condition leading to the main Malaysian cities. Even Poland’s manufacturing country has changed their MBT to M1A2 Abrams since the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) – Bumar Laberdy for the PT91 Twardy, has already closed their factory production in Poland. This could be difficult for Malaysia to find parts replacement for their PT91Ms which are still in the Malaysia Army inventory with no plan of new models replacement in the near future. For the record, the present Malaysian Army of today had less number of tanks in its inventory compared to the number of tanks used by the IJA during their southern thrust to Singapore in 1942;
• For the Malaysian Army to start reviewing the existing use of towed artillery and replace it with the Self Propelled Howitzers (SPH) that can offer a significant advantage for mobility, armour protection, fewer crew operators and accessible gun sights setting during combat compared to the traditional towed artillery. The timing to deploy, set and manoeuvre the gun could be fatal to the crew while under fire as what was experienced by the British Field Regiments units operating the 25 pounder artillery gun during the Malayan campaign in 1942;
• The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) needs to learn from the lesson of history on the importance of having a solid aerial defence with the right capability. This would put the MAF at a better advantage in aerial combat since air domination is a pre-requisite for a smooth army and navy operation as what had been experienced by the British during the Malayan campaign with the sinking of Prince of Wales battleship and land operation in Kampar, Gemas and Johore in 1942. The current inventories of the Malaysian air assets desperately need the addition of modern combat aircrafts with multi-purpose of air combat, deterrence and maritime patrol. The current plan by the RMAF to procure new Multirole Combat Aircraft and the Light Combat Aircraft should be supported by all levels of government-related agencies and the Malaysian public as a whole and should not be seen as a waste of public money;
• The clear need for the National Defence University of Malaysia, Royal Military College (RMC), or the MAF’s Staff College to nurture military leaders, best tactician, and strategists with a resolute spirit that can decide, think, anticipate what’s enemy next steps and outsmart an enemy under duress in combat; and
• The need for Malaysia to continue to engage the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to safeguard and uphold our national interest coincides with Australia regarding keeping Malaysia safe from foreign infringement. History has taught that more often than not, both countries’ interests are often intertwined on defence matters (from WW2 to Emergency). It was apt for Malaysia to explore better cooperation on military training, parts sharing on shared military platforms, and various other military collaborations about the recent comprehensive strategic partnership MoU’s signed by both nations in 2021. The presence of the ADF in Malaysia should continually be welcomed in the future.

 

21. The lessons of the Battle of Malaya/ Singapore, 1942, the Malaysian public should clearly understand that we are no stranger to an armed conflict. The fall of the Malayan peninsular and Singapore just within 75 days compared to the defence of the Philippines by the Americans, which lasted up to almost five months, would alter the course of history for the natives in Malaysia. Not only that it marks the start of the end of the British Empire in Southeast Asia, but it also instigated the rise of nationalism among the Malays who were awoken on the fallacy of the British invincibility. For the first time after being ruled for almost 160 years by the British, the Malays realised that the British couldn’t provide them with protection as we were promised hence the need for Malaya to seek independence and chart their self-course of nation-building.

 

[Photo credit: Internet]