It has been almost eight months passed since the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état toppling the democratically elected government of the National League of Democracy (NLD) lead by Aung Sang Suu Kyi in Myanmar, and yet the resolution by its neighbouring nations especially from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was careful and meticulous in avoiding for it to be seen as directly intervening into the domestic politics of Myanmar even though the military junta’s action was a clear violation of the ASEAN Charter. This is understandable since ASEAN itself was very clear on its policy of non-intervention into the domestic matters of member countries, plus ASEAN was never a strong proponent of the freedom agenda or democracy unlike most Western countries such as the European Union (EU) or the United States (US). However, with the arising age of the Great-Power Competition (GPC) and the effect of globalisation, matters concerning one domestic politics would affect the security of surrounding states. For example, the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) of the Rohingya reaching the shores of Thailand, Malaysia, and Myanmar in seeking safe haven from oppressive regime at Rakhine state which according to the 2019 United Nations (UN) report is accused to be committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under the watchful eye of ASEAN. The refugees in Cox’s Bazar bear witness to this persecution, and after six (6) years of democratic experiment with the full backing of ASEAN, Myanmar in February 2021 has returned to the old order of a military junta like they once were in 1962.
The formation of ASEAN in 1967 was predicated on the basis of culture, economic, and trade with a strong emphasis on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) among the newly independent member states of Southeast Asia for preventive diplomacy. The ever-cumbersome manner of reaching a mutual consensus in the ASEAN decision-making process, dubbed as the ASEAN Way to handle matters pertaining to intra-ASEAN issues however has attracted sharp criticism among security scholars. There has arisen the need for ASEAN to re-examine the relevancy of the ASEAN Way whenever ASEAN faced latent threats at its doorsteps either through the destabilising effects of the GPC (US, China, and Russia) or various trans-national issues at the causal effect of instabilities arising from domestic politics of ASEAN members states. Although the last major conflict fought among the Southeast Asia countries was the Vietnam-Cambodia War (1979-1989) which saw for the first time ASEAN took part in the reconstruction and peacekeeping operations, the conflict was also a wake-up call to ASEAN that regional problems are better left for regional bodies to handle taking into account the experience of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in integrating former Warsaw Pact members into an open and free society of the Western bloc. Since then, ASEAN has realised the need for and importance of it to also cover on issues related to security and transnational matters apart from culture, economic, and trade. As such in the later years ASEAN agreed to the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and later the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 to also cover the possibility for security and defence cooperation to be established with the inclusion of dialogue partners outside the ASEAN sphere.
The evolution of ASEAN as a benign and good-spirited regional body at its inception that focuses on lesser contentious issues pertaining to culture, economic and trade and later shifted to trans-national issues and on quasi-military matters such as maritime security, cyber security, and various security concerns proves that ASEAN cannot remain stagnant or tolerant on just benevolent concerns. Amid the high distrust among ASEAN member states that still have disputes on border issues among each other and do not share a homogeneous culture, religion, or language, there must be a commonly accepted platform that can be used to discuss security issues within ASEAN in a transparent and robust manner. In relation to this, ASEAN has underscored the importance of security matters by introducing the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in line with the ASEAN Charter that was introduced in 2007. Since then, the ARF and ADMM/ ADMM-Plus have evolved to cover not only issues related to the Southeast Asia geopolitical sphere but also concerns and matters related to the interest of its dialogue partners. However, with the inclusion of the big powers as dialogue partners in the ARF and ADMM-Plus, the focus has shifted to GPC issues of concerns such as Taiwan, North Korea, Senkakus, or even Illegal Unregulated Unreported (IUU) fishing activities outside the Southeast Asia region. It would be best for the ADMM-Plus to stick to the parameters set and concentrate on just six (6) working groups that had been identified for its annual consultations and deliberations which are humanitarian assistance disaster relief (HADR), maritime security, military medicine, counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian mine action, and cyber security and not being swayed by the GPC agendas of influence.
With the rise of China, ASEAN as one single body instead of ten (10) small member states with a total population reaching up to 600 million people is currently China’s largest trading partner. It has also become more important than ever as a strong regional organisation in pursuing a balanced approach to deter and handle China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea (SCS). Located at the centre between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, 60% of world maritime trade moves through the Straits of Malacca (SoM) and SCS including most of the world’s Navy, it is imperative for ASEAN to support the agenda in keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open at the best interest of its member states. This however could be tricky and difficult, since each of the ASEAN member states has its own unique approaches in pursuing their national interests and would prefer to deal with China bilaterally rather than through ASEAN. This could be witnessed through several incidences that have undermine ASEAN Centrality such as when Cambodia colluded with China in blocking the 2012 Joint Statement of ASEAN that would put China’s activities at SCS in a bad light. Another was on Laos that is too pro-China for an exchange of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investment to an extent there was a strong belief that Laos is the furthest China “outpost” in Southeast Asia with the ongoing Kunming-Vientiane railway project and lastly when Philippines President, Rodrigo Duterte shifted his country foreign policy outlook on China to 180 degrees from the previous administration in a desperate move to lure China’s investment. China’s rise could have a destabilising effect on regional security in Southeast Asia since it continues to adopt the wolf warrior diplomacy approach and was always angry in defending its interest through the propagation of extreme nationalism towards any perceived foreign criticism including on SCS claims.
ASEAN member states are marred with problems of regime legitimacy, human rights violations, and in desperate need for a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost their economy or to placate their citizens’ demand of needs. Take the Philippines again as a classic case of two different approaches by two different Presidents back-to-back when dealing with China. In 2013, after much frustration due to the delay tactics used by China on the SCS Code of Conduct (CoC), former President Benigno Aquino III unilaterally registered a case for the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to review the legality of China’s activities at the SCS and the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim which were based on implausible historical facts. Even though the verdict by the PCA in 2016 was unanimously clear – under the 1982 United Nations Conventions Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) China had breached the provisions through their reclamation and development activities of the occupied atolls and there was no basis on the historical rights made by China, the next President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte chooses to tone down the PCA verdict in hoping for China’s investment that was later turned to nothing. With the straddling of the GPC in ASEAN, big powers saw ASEAN as a good ground to pursue their interest in amplifying their concerns. Take the US for an example that was never a member of the 1982 UNCLOS but had been using the UNCLOS clauses on the freedom of navigation and overflights in containing China’s assertive claims in SCS. Another one was recent and much long-awaited for the United Kingdom (UK) to actively involved as an ASEAN dialogue partner furthermore in sending their most powerful nuclear aircraft carrier-HMS Queen Elizabeth to the East of Suez for the first time since their withdrawal from Singapore in 1971 for the purpose of power projection through Freedom of Navigation and Operations (FONOPs) has been seen to have a direct relation to China’s strong presence at SCS.
ASEAN diversification from only revolves around economic, trade, and culture to ARF and ADMM-Plus with extra more regional bodies such as Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) and East Asia Summit (EAS) that consist of almost similar participating nations as the ASEAN+3/+6/+10 had made ASEAN redundant with the same repeating messages of pressing need to contain China apart from nurturing various other cooperation. Even at the side-lines of ADMM-Plus, the Plus countries (US, India, Japan, and Australia) even managed to form the Quad arrangement with similar intent and purpose of aforementioned without extricating China’s positive outlook on trade. Such development has the effect of compromising the ASEAN Centrality with GPC were seen interested in using ASEAN as their sounding board instead of focusing on real ASEAN matters.
It has been observed that recently some of the strongest critics of ASEAN came from Indonesia either from the country’s still serving and former diplomats or even security observers from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) based in Jakarta. This is understandable since Indonesia is the largest ASEAN member not only in terms of its geographical space but also with a 200 million population (1/3 of ASEAN whole). Indonesia could be the staunchest supporter of the ASEAN Charter when Marty Natalegawa, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia and a respected scholar on ASEAN matters gave one of the strongest critiques to date on the failure of ASEAN to properly react to the Tatmadaw regime’s violation of human rights and the inhumane persecution of political dissent in Myanmar. Indonesia’s no-nonsense approach whenever they faced the incursion of the Chinese fishermen within their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was seen as a necessity when most of the ASEAN members would not dare to push back China at the harm of China’s investment, mostly the BRI.
Indonesia’s interest in seeing ASEAN’s triumph and success as one solid entity of an effective regional body in the modern period is the apt one. Not only from the perspective of its national interest, but perhaps Indonesia nowadays is the most open and free society on civil thoughts and freedom of expression including on regional matters. Furthermore, Indonesia was not a claimant in SCS but the only country with natural island features at the Natuna and Anambas that are within the nine-dash line claims by China. With the ASEAN Secretariat located in Jakarta, the Indonesian role as the main coordinator on matters concerning ASEAN issues are not only prescient but a fair one by design. Furthermore, the integral nationalism concept of Indonesian that was predicated on Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila is seen as not biased towards any religious leanings that could stir nationalist movement with an emotional reaction. Indonesia too has proved that they are capable of handling separatist movements the Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (GAM) – a Muslim extremist group through peaceful negotiations although paradoxically Indonesia is also a moderate Muslim country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia’s views and comments on ASEAN issues should be seen as an oracle of what’s needed to be done to keep ASEAN strong and relevant especially when those comments and suggestions came from the likes of Marty Natalegawa, Rizal Sukma, or Evan Laksamana. Indonesia’s continuous role in leading or spearheading an effort to troubleshoot ASEAN whenever the organisation encounters new challenges or faces hindrances as one cohesive body should be welcomed and closely observed.
ASEAN has evolved so much for the past 54 years since its formation. During its time, it had faced several challenges which could have jeopardised its creation purposes. First was when the Philippines laid claim to Sabah in 1967, next was the disparate period of the Cold War and the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and at present the clear failure of ASEAN in handling Myanmar’s domestic problems which has a direct impact on ASEAN security itself. For ASEAN to keep itself relevant as an efficient regional body, it needs to be brave in setting and traversing new waters of strategic outlook to achieve its true capability. The European Union (EU) must be seen as a good example of a regional body for ASEAN to emulate. Without properly moving towards that direction, ASEAN will merely be seen as a platform for deliberations on peripheral matters in trying to only look good and benign without bringing any clear long-term benefits. ASEAN needs to make certain decisions that are difficult but necessary for the longevity of its unity under the spirit of ASEAN Centrality. It should not allow certain member states to undermine the ASEAN Centrality in pursuing personal agendas by becoming a tool for GPC.
ASEAN should never be a subset to GPC and matters concerning ASEAN must come first before any of the interest of its dialogue partners. It has to return to parameters that were set prior concerning only ASEAN matters whenever meeting with its dialogue partners such as the Experts’ Working Group (EWG) in ADMM-Plus. To nurture ASEAN in becoming a cohesive body that is effective in handling security concerns, it needs to make certain compromises with regards to member states’ sovereign rights. The ASEAN Charter could be a very good document that could be improved further. The question that needs to be asked is, how far is ASEAN willing to test its true power and potential as a new effective regional bloc? Or would we allow the opportunity for ASEAN to mature into a solid regional body to slip away by prioritising attractive investment of the great power nations for a selfish agenda?
[Photo credit: internet]
