WAR IN UKRAINE: A LESSON LEARNED FOR MALAYSIA’S DEFENCE READINESS

  1. The Defence Services Asia 2022 (DSA 2022) organised in Kuala Lumpur from 28 to 31 March 2022 was a success. The event lives up to its name as Asia’s most prominent defence exhibition. Ever since the outbreak of Covid-19 in late 2019, which limits our physical interaction, including trade and business activities, most of the world’s citizens have been appropriately vaccinated, which slowly allowed for normalcy. The success of the DSA 2022 event marked the sign of better days to come for defence trade in Asia, if not the world. Although the event has not been participated by defence companies from Russia and Ukraine for the most apparent reason, comments and feedback received from the exhibitors and participating companies were outstanding. In particular, exhibitors that specialised in marines and aerospace technologies would expect a better outcome during next year’s Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) Exhibition, which was postponed in 2021 due to the Covid-19 outbreak. The peak of the DSA 2022 for Malaysia was the defence contract signing ceremony, which saw local companies bequeathed a sum of RM4.6 billion worth of government contracts for the supplies and maintenance of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) defence assets and its services branch operations.

 

  1. For the local defence and security observers, the most awaited announcement during the DSA 2022 was the Malaysian government decision concerning the procurement of the Medium Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MALE UAV) and Light Combat Aircraft – Flight Lead in Trainer (LCA-FLIT) which the due process of assessment has been fully completed by MINDEF and passed the tender deadline in the past month. However, the winners for both international tenders strangely were not announced during the event as many expected. The budget for both procurement (almost amounted to RM4.5 billion), however, has been allocated within Malaysia’s five-year plan No. 12 (RMKe-12) [2021-2025] and agreed in principle for No. 13 (RMKe-13) [2025-2030]. Surprisingly the tender process was stipulated for an international tender, which was a bold move by the policymakers at the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF), considering the common business ethos of the previous practices that used to favour local third party as an agent of supply. This was probably made amid the opportunity arises during the change of government in 2018 to avoid the usual custom for MINDEF of having a middle man for big contracts involving defence spending. This was also a clear statement by MINDEF and the MAF itself on the need for the government to honour the end user-oriented needs, which has also been underscored in the 2019 Defence White Paper. Such a move would avoid selecting the type of defence assets that for the past 30 years were rampantly lobbied by political affiliated contractors’ patrons by corrupt politicians.

 

  1. That being said, it was made to be understood that the two procurement decisions on MALE UAV and LCA-FLIT for the MAF will be announced as soon as the MoF is delighted with the assessment report made by MINDEF, debase its further decision on the requirement for future offset activities and the right of payment mode for the procurement. It was no secret that apart from the need for Transfer of Technology (ToT) activities through the local defence companies, the standard mode of financial transaction preferred was through the palm oil trade-off, which Malaysia is currently one of the largest producers of such products. This writing will elaborate further on this at the end of the write-up. Defence observers cannot forget the appeal that the MAF’s Chief made to the Defence Force, Tan Sri Affendi Buang, on the 29 March 2022 during the DSA 2022, which was reported in the local defence and security news web – the Airtimes News Network on the dire need for the government to seriously consider the need to modernise and replace most of the old, dilapidated assets within the MAF’s inventory.

 

  1. The scandal involving the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS), which has delayed the delivery of such assets from 2017 to now, a new timeline of 2025, which the government has newly set, would put the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) at a tilted balance of continuing to operate the old assets within the existing inventory that can be traced back to 50 years old. This can significantly affect the effectiveness of the RMN in safeguarding the Malaysian interest within our waters. Moreover, amid the ever-presence and the existing threat of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to continue to harass PETRONAS in their venture for deep-sea energy research within Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) at the South China Sea, the assets deficiency could prove tricky and challenging for the RMN to safeguard Malaysian sovereign rights without with the help of our strategic defence partners such as the United States Navy or the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) – e.g. HMAS Parramatta which came to PETRONAS’ assistance during the Haiyang Dizhi 8 incident in the year 2020. The breather for the RMN was completing the first phase of the four units of the Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) – The Keris class that was ironically made in China, with the last one received in December 2021. RMN is also still waiting for the government the announcement for the next phase of the LMS project and the long-awaited Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) project that can bridge the needs of operation between the two theatres (Peninsular and East Malaysia) in fulfilling the RMN’s overall 15 to 5 program. With the recent announcement made by the Indonesian government to purchase six states of the art FREMM frigates from Fincantieri, which was targeted to deliver its first ship in 2026, this awkward situation will put the Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) – the primary contractor for the LCS – The Maharajalela class is tremendous pressure to finish and deliver the first long-awaited LCS to the RMN. If BNS still fails to deliver the first LCS to the RMN by 2025, it will be the last threshold line for Malaysia to declare the complete failure of the LCS project. It was duly noted that the non-participation of the Boustead Heavy Industry Corporation (BHIC) Bhd. during DSA 2022, and one could only speculate that the non-presence of such a prominent local defence company could perhaps be related to the LCS mentioned above scandal as a save face measure.

 

  1. During the press conference after the contracts signing ceremony for MINDEF at DSA 2022, the incumbent Malaysian Defence Minister Hishamuddin Hussein while answering questions from the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reporter on the progress of the Malaysian effort to procure Hornet surplus from Kuwait, the defence minister responded that the action would involve a bilateral effort. Malaysia is the only country in Southeast Asia operating the F/A-18D Hornet, which was procured in 1997. It was the most formidable fighter jet used by any Southeast Asian nation during that time. However, Malaysia’s neighbour, Singapore, has also operated the variants of the F-16 since the late 1980s. The number of the procured F/A-18D for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) never amounts to the full squadron strength of a conventional air force. The disposition of these Hornets was under the RMAF’s No. 18 squadron and has been in operation from the Butterworth Airbase ever since its acceptance in 1997. This had given the RMAF good opportunities to carry out air combat exercises with their long historical partners, primarily with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), that are operating a similar type of aircraft and biennially deployed their Hornets to the Butterworth Air Base for the Bersama LIMA Exercise under the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) ambit. Such bilateral and multilateral military cooperation gave the RMAF’s Hornet aviators a better concept of interoperability with strategic partners, ensuring continuous capability training and better maintenance opportunities, especially involving parts sharing. It was duly noted that a similar Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) within the RMAF inventory which Russia made – the MIG29N, had to be decommissioned early in 2017 due to its being worn out with a high cost of maintenance. The MIG29N and the F/A-18D were bought almost during the same time, respectively, in 1995 and 1997.

 

  1. Looking back at the current situation with the ongoing war in Europe between Ukraine and Russia and its effect on Malaysia’s military readiness, it is best for the country to pursue Kuwait’s Hornet project in earnest while the opportunity is still open. Moreover, the war and economic sanctions imposed upon Russia would directly impact countries operating Russian-made assets/ equipment. This would have a long term effect on our Sukhoi 30-MKM. Due to sanctions imposed by the Western countries, Russia’s defence industries are facing problems in repairing or further producing the T-80 tank, which is currently being deployed to Ukraine due to disruptions of supply parts. The sanctions imposed by the West in 2014 had also halted Russia’s T-14 Armata tank project at its onset. While answering the lower house question at the Parliament on 16 March 2022 about Sukhoi 30-MKM aircraft and what was the effect of the war on the Sukhoi’s airworthiness amid economic sanctions towards Russia, Minister Hishammuddin confidently responded that the Ministry is looking for parts supply options from India or Belarus and the Sukhois would be guaranteed to fly for at least another two years under the existing Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) contract between MINDEF and Aerospace Technology Systems Corp (ATSC) Sdn. Bhd. Is the main contractor for the Sukhoi’s maintenance. This is an acceptable explanation, at least for the time being, but defence analysts would speculate that the airworthiness guaranteed by ATSC Sdn within these two years. Bhd. would surely be hedging upon the detriment of the Sukhoi’s flying hours that have to be decreased to lengthen the period of its overall flying period. Malaysian Sukhois are currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Programme (SLEP) until the end of this year, which is supposed to guarantee it continues to be in operation for at least another 10 years. We can only hope that ATSC Sdn. Bhd. can continue to guarantee the supply of parts for these Sukhois with the ever-increasing sanctions upon Russia. Malaysia doesn’t have the same luxury as the Indian Sukhois, which were procured and operated in high numbers, allowing some to be cannibalised should the circumstances require.

 

  1. Apart from the famous Sukhois and the MiGs for the country’s application of an eastern platform defence assets, the Malaysian Army is also the operator of the Main Battle Tank (MBT) PT-91M Twardy, which was also given the local name Pendekar. The tank that was built in Poland by the Bumar Laberdy Company which was no longer in production but was upgraded from a similar blueprint of the T-72 Soviet design of chassis strength and firepower technology and was also being used by Ukraine and Russia in the current war apart from the more modern T-80 variants. That being said, in the present war in Ukraine, we can observe the effect of an Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) and the Next Generation Anti-Tank Weapons (NLAW) made by the West when the might of the Russian armoured columns were rampantly and successfully being ambushed and attacked by the Ukrainian Army using this weapon. To say that those tanks were obliterated by the NLAW is an understatement. The Russian Forces even had to self-modify the used tanks by installing a roll cage on top of the tank’s turret for better protection from the NLAW and drones attack. We can see videos from open sources such as Twitter and Youtube which showed that once the NLAW or ATGM hit a Russian tank during an ambush, the other tanks were swiftly abandoned by the Russian tank crews, along with their infantrymen scurrying hard to get as far away as possible from the tank’s column because they feel threatened by the NLAW adequate firepower. This was a sheer change from the traditional use of armoured vehicles in conventional warfare as if the usage of tanks itself is no longer relevant due to the development of a more lethal and effective ATGM and NLAW, which would be deemed for a mechanised unit of any conventional army to review back their MBT doctrine in war.

 

  1. This provides clear lessons for the Malaysian Army in the doctrine development involving tank operations under the new threat of the ATGM and NLAW. The most famous arguments and justification of why the Malaysian Army procured the PT-91M Twardy Pendekar tank and not the much more expensive high-end MBTs such as the Leopard 2 made by the Germans and was repeatedly pushed down the throats of local defence observers were due to its cheapness compared to any of the Western-made tanks. Plus, the amateur justification was that the PT-91M tank was lighter than the German tanks and was deemed more appropriate and suitable to be operated within the Malaysian jungles terrain that can easily bog down a tank in swamps and rivers. That theory was recently debunked by the Russian experience in Ukraine that had to abandon their tanks of a similar design – the T-80 variants when it was stuck deep in the Ukrainian mud, proving that the prior theory on the lighter tank was downright wrong and misleading. Moreover, in the Malaysian modern environment conditions with just a limited number of PT-91M tanks in operation, the MBTs indeed will be prioritised to safeguard Malaysian strategic points such as its vast and modern highways, bridges and defilement in the time of war and not to be deployed deep in the jungle (and to what purposes?). Undoubtedly the issue of getting stuck in the mud would never occur unless it was a made believe justification after sales were being made intended to hide the flaw of the decision in the first place.

 

  1. The number of tanks in the Malaysian Army inventory, which is now below 50, was a big question mark to be debated in terms of tactics and the relevancy of tank operations. When Russia developed cheap tanks like the T-72, it was based on a tank warfare doctrine that was cheap and quick to produce in high numbers intended to overwhelm much more superior and expensive tanks made by NATO countries if ever those two superpowers went against each other in the plains of Europe. What were the stark considerations that need to be reviewed and thoroughly understood by the Malaysian policymakers, which also proved that the former Malaysian regime not only made a wrong decision to procure just only 48 of the PT-91M Twardy in 2003 for the Malaysian Army but the purchase was not based on rational war tactics for the Malaysian environment that required for more efficient deployment of military capabilities due to limitation of operation based on terrains in the jungle tropics including the Malaysian urban areas and should not be applied to the same tactics adopted by the Warsaw pact nations during the Cold War? Perhaps the decision to go for an ex-Soviet technology with the MBTs program was just intended to upset the West when such procurement was a clear vote of no confidence by the Malaysian leadership at that time which was a significant shift from the Western technology application that the Malaysian Army were so accustomed to before we start to procure any of the Russia/ eastern made weaponry beginning in the late 1990s. This was pervasive in various military procurements made in the 1990s to 2000s with the likes of the MiG29Ns in 1995, Sukhoi 30-MKM in 2003 and the PT-91M Twardy in 2009. Could it be this was just Tun Dr. Mahathir’s agenda and the effect of his tunnel vision over what he perceived as the ‘evil West’ with the neo-conservative agenda that was trying to re-colonize Malaysia, which resulted in him pivoting the Malaysian strategic defence procurement to Russia or the eastern bloc weaponry system after his infamous Buy British Last policy in 1981? If this was true, then all the defence procurement policies that were adopted under his tenure were based on an imbalance of xenophobic personal emotions and were not found in the existing MAF military doctrine that was closely tied up to the FPDA countries, which such decision had affected the long term MAF’s overall capabilities due to the defects of the socialist state products.

 

  1. The war in Ukraine continues to offer Malaysia good lessons on the correct procurement policy and the latest exemplary modern warfare doctrine for a true assessment of MAF’s capability as an effective defence force. The opportunity now comes for MINDEF Malaysia and the MAF to reassess and re-strategize the last 30 years of defence spending. Rectification should be made while the opportunity is still open regarding our MRCA program by procuring the Kuwaiti Hornets to temporarily plug the gap of our MRCAs until 2035 based on the RMAF Capability Plan 2055 (CAP 55). The various related agencies in Malaysia, especially those directly involved with defence spendings, such as policymakers at MoF and MINDEF, should do everything to scrape a budget and persuade the Kuwaiti government to sell their Hornet surplus to Malaysia. We must also take the opportunity to replace the obsolete RPG-7 for the Malaysian Army infantrymen that are currently in used and replaced it with a much more proven ATGM such as the NLAW that Saab is producing, considering the proven lethal effect it has on Russia’s tanks, plus the advantage is held by the ‘fire and forget mode’ which guarantees the user a swift and safe operation without revealing the location of the shooter. Furthermore, the stark need for the Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH), which are long overdue that are yet to be equipped for the Malaysian Army in the modern period as can be witnessed by the devastating effect of the counter-battery fire from the Ukrainian Army on the Russian Forces that were operating the towed artillery systems akin to MAF’s weaponry.

 

  1. Malaysia as the main supplier of petroleum products, is currently enjoying trade excess with the increase of oil prices due to the war in Europe, which at the time of this writing exceeds the USD100 per barrel mark. The profit made should be used directly on defence spending to plug the dire defence need of the MAF, which was also impacted by the war in Europe by using Russia made products. We have witnessed for ourselves how the RMAF had to deploy the ageing Hawk 108/ 208 from the RMAF’s 5th Squadron in Jun 2021 to patrol the Sarawak EEZ during the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) unannounced incursion within the Sarawak FIR which have had an impact on the safety of civilian overflights within the aforementioned Flight Information Region (FIR). Such incidents prove the need for more MRCA aircraft capable of a maritime patrol. What best for Malaysia to have than the existing type of aircraft from Kuwait’s surplus to complement the RMAF 18th squadron at least to full strength and then some for better RMAF’s aerial operation.

 

  1. Perhaps the most misleading belief involving Malaysia’s defence procurement was the “doctrine of trade” via the palm oil trade-off that is being strongly upheld by the financial controller at the MoF whenever the need arises for the country to buy any of the defence assets for the MAF. When the best defence articles or defence capabilities were generally made in the West, which also has reservations about Southeast Asia’s palm oil industry, the strong conditions sets by the MoF through this mode of payments would resort for Malaysia to acquire defence capabilities mostly from a lesser quality without putting the primary needs of the MAF’s services branch at the forefront. Moreover, the long term cost involved would be hard to be contemplated by the financial controller whenever the MoF presses for the palm oil payment for defence procurement. Often can be seen, the first batch of armaments deliveries indeed would involve a palm oil trade-off sprinkled with a few theatricalities such as the superficial astronaut’s program intended to gain the public support as what can be witnessed when we bought the Sukhois in 2003, but the after-sales and long term financial implication such as the MRO, ground crew training etc. would be dealt through the regular financial payments in US Dollars which usually were more expensive than what we initially perceive. Not to mention the military branch that has to put up with the lesser quality type of assets for at least 20 to 30 years of its operation to come.

 

  1. This was made worse by the closed architecture trait of the eastern platform’s systems, limiting the operational time span for the assets procured, such as the MIG29Ns and the PT-91M Twardy tank. The Polish government in 2022, the original country producer for the PT-91M Twardy tank, even announced their decision to buy and adopt the M1A2 Abrams Tank from the United States to replace the obsolete Soviet technology. This situation is entirely different from any Western-made platform assets that can be improved from time to time on the original design to lengthen its operational time span based on current changes and needs. Testament to this was our F/A-18D that are expected to be in operation for the next 15 years or the Leopard 2 tanks, which are being upgraded to Leopard 2A4 and 2A5 currently being used by the Indonesia Army, or even the F-15 aircraft which are being upgraded into the F-15EX version and recently being offered for new procurement to the Indonesian Air Force after almost 50 years of its first flight in the 1970s. Malaysia has a lot to unlearn and relearn regarding the defence procurement for its military assets, and the policymakers should attentively observe the development of the war in Europe for good insights.

 

  1. It will be another 20 to 30 years for Malaysia to amend the mistakes caused by misguided beliefs on defence procurement capabilities. Despite the country’s MAF reason de’etre for a defensive posture, which was never an expeditionary one, it was pretty baffling for Malaysia to resort to a dual platforms mode for its military assets capability on the pretext of a risk arising from a conflict with the Western nations or even once swallowed the ‘source code’ myth from the arms lobbyist for the last 30 years to justify the need to buy any Russian made aircraft for the RMAF. We should be thankful that the existing bilateral defence cooperation and multilateral defence arrangements such as the Malaysia – Australia Joint Defence Programs (MAJDP) and the FPDA, from time to time, continue to realign us back to the true north of the MAF combat readiness. Moreover, observing the war unfolding in Ukraine would offer us an excellent lesson for our defence survival. That is why the mistakes committed in the last 30 years must be rectified by choosing the right capabilities for the MAF’s MALE UAV and LCA-FLIT program.

 

[Photo credit: MalaysiaGazette]

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