The Turkish Air Force (TAF) recently took delivery of the Akinci (Turkish for raider) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) developed by the indigenous technology firm Bayraktar. With the Akinci, Turkey’s already impressive fleet of armed drones that has made a difference in battle zones like Libya and Syria is further bolstered. Owing to the Akinci’s combat capabilities on paper at least, some of which are unprecedented, the defence commentariat has understandingly been glowing in its praise for the new Turkish drone, describing it as “game changing” and “next generation”, among other things. These accolades are merited, but only to a certain extent. All things considered, while the Akinci will move the UCAV needle significantly, it should be regarded as just a very capable adjunct to manned airpower.
Step Change in UCAV Capabilities
What is arguably most eye-catching about the Akinci is its ability to launch beyond visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAMs); in other words, engage aerial targets 20 nautical miles (37 kilometres) or more away. While the missile in question, the Gokdogan (Turkish for peregrine), is still under development, it was already test-fired in 2018 and should enter service within the next few years. With its high-end sensors and BVRAAMs, the Akinci will be able to hold at risk from distance enemy drones, helicopters, and in favourable circumstances even jet planes, especially the slower-flying ones. The Akinci is also compatible with a shorter-range AAM named Bozdogan, or Merlin in Turkish. It is worth noting that both missiles are locally made, attesting to Ankara’s burgeoning homegrown defence industry.
Having an air-to-air capability of any sort is absent on any UCAV in the world currently and for the near future. Indeed, even the latest variant of the MQ-9 Reaper, the mainstay UCAV in United States Air Force (USAF) service, is not equipped for this. Ditto the most capable assets of the other major drone powers China and Israel. Therefore, unless the Reaper’s successor, which is currently known as the MQ-Next programme and is slated to enter service from 2030, is BVRAAM-capable as planned, the Akinci will probably be unsurpassed in this regard until then.
Another feature of the Akinci not present on any other UCAV yet is that it is long-range cruise missile-capable. As the platform is compatible with the new indigenous Stand Off Missile (SOM) family of munitions, it can hit surface targets, whether on land or at sea, about 250 km away. Given that the Akinci has a typical combat radius of some 600 km, this means that it can attack the enemy from over 800 km away. The SOM’s long range coupled with a 230-kilogram warhead hence enables the Akinci to strike at what would be termed as “strategic” targets deep within enemy territory, such as leadership and logistical nodes. In stark contrast, the main surface-attack weapon of the Reaper is the Hellfire whose range is barely a dozen kilometres., and this in essence means the U.S. drone can only strike at “tactical” targets.
Moreover, in a relatively permissive environment where the enemy does not pose a credible air-to-air threat (more on this below), the Akinci’s stand-off capability renders it less vulnerable to all but the most long-range air-defence assets. After all, save for the Russian-made “triple-digit” surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, most other air-defence capabilities are unable to defend against threats over 200 km away. For instance, the U.S.-made Patriot SAM, which is top-of-the line in the air-defence business today, has a range of only 70 km.
Complement, not Replacement for Manned Aircraft
Ultimately, Turkey’s latest drone, for all its hyped-up “game-changing” capabilities, is arguably more of an evolutionary than revolutionary platform, and it merely augments and cannot supplant manned airpower. The main caveat is that the Akinci, like all its unmanned contemporaries, is highly vulnerable in an operating environment where the adversary has credible airpower. This is because like all other unmanned aircraft today, the Turkish drone is propeller-driven, and this makes it relatively slow and cumbersome. Given its lack of speed and agility, the Akinci will make an easy picking in the face of enemy fighters and SAMs.
Nevertheless, in more permissive situations such as low-intensity conflicts against non-state actors which usually possess little or no airpower, the Akinci is a reasonable stand-in for its piloted counterparts. After all, it is cheaper (in terms of flying hours and the concomitant maintenance costs) to fly a drone as compared to a crewed fighter. Indeed, when it becomes fully operational, the Akinci can help ameliorate the increasing demands placed on the TAF’s manned aircraft fleet by Turkey’s activist geopolitical strategy. The Akinci can then take on some of the ground-attack responsibilities being borne mainly by the TAF’s F-16 jets, many of which are ageing. Moreover, Ankara’s eviction from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme means that the TAF will not have a fifth-generation jet until the 2030s when the indigenous TF-X enters service. In the interim, the Akinci can make for a decent stop-gap measure – under certain circumstances as noted.
All in all, the notion that UCAVs can take on some duties of manned airplanes is not entirely new. However, the Akinci’s prowess, especially its BVRAAMs and stand-off land-attack capabilities, makes it even more potent compared to its contemporaries. It is worth noting that Bayraktar has seen an upsurge in interest for its TB2 drone which made made headlines during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Given that the Akinci is much more capable than the TB2 – for instance, the former also has a payload tenfold that of the latter – it is understandable that there is already “a lot of interest” in the Akinci from potential buyers, as Bayraktar has noted. When the Akinci fully comes on board with the Turkish Air Force and starts racking up combat successes, expect then more interest in this UCAV and further entrenchment of Turkey as a major drone power.
