Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) relation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is unique in a sense that it is not only multi-faceted, but also multi-layered. Their interactions cover not only functional economic interests, but also security interests. These engagements are conducted either bilaterally between North Korea with respective individual ASEAN member state, or multilaterally via ASEAN as a regional body. However, despite the importance of bilateral interactions which serve as the basis or laying foundation of the relationship between ASEAN states with the DPRK in the earlier period, the significance of multilateralism has been increasing in the recent years due to the function of three factors, namely: economy primacy; Korean peace process; and deterioration of North Korea’s relations with both U.S and China.
Economic cooperation and trade relations between North Korea and Southeast Asia began with its bilateral ties with individual Southeast Asian country prior to their engagement with ASEAN as a whole. North Korea’s trade with Southeast Asian countries although can be characterized as modest, but still is able to provide Pyongyang the opportunity and space it needs to reduce economic dependency on China. In addition, ASEAN member states – notably Malaysia – are an important destination for North Korean overseas workers, another important source of hard currency for DPRK. On the multilateral front, trade with ASEAN excluding Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam is US$181 million for 2015, where Philippine alone is North Korea’s third largest trading partner with total trade amounting to US$87 million in 2016.[1] Import from Thailand and Philippine placed them among North Korea’s top five importers behind China, India and Russia.[2] In short, representing the very few friends that North Korea retains in the international community today, ASEAN member states remain as a significant part of Pyongyang’s non-China trade profile.
Meanwhile, as the Six-Party Talks led by U.S and other major regional powers stalled, while the Trump-Kim Summits in both Singapore and Hanoi failed to yield concrete results, the situation has opened up rooms for ASEAN to fill the vacuum by playing a unique and crucial role in facilitating the Korean Peace Process. The role of ASEAN and ASEAN Plus institutions however, are not as a direct mediator. What ASEAN could offer is only a platform for the two Koreas and other relevant parties to negotiate and discuss on the issue. For Pyongyang, despite ASEAN’s stance on calling for North Korea’s denuclearization, the regime seems comfortable regarding its participation under the ARF because of its close and cordial bilateral relations with individual ASEAN member states.
ASEAN’s leverage on the Korean Peninsula issue, however, should not be overrated. ASEAN and ARF can only play limited role as a neutral facilitator in the process and not as a direct mediator because it simply does not have the capacity to do so. This is where the bilateral nexus comes into the picture. It was not just a coincidence that the first two summits between the United States and North Korea took place in ASEAN countries — Singapore and Vietnam. Instead, this is due to what the DPRK calls an established “Traditional Friendship.” This connection was built through its warm historical ties with fellow communist-socialist nations such as Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as through Indonesia’s former communist- leaning leader, Soekarno.[3] ASEAN, therefore, is seen as a trusted partner to the DPRK.
Meanwhile, deterioration in DPRK-U.S relations can be observed clearly following the Singapore Summit in 2018. Both parties failed to strike a deal in their second meeting in Hanoi in February 2019. Kim proposed dismantling his Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for the lifting of most international sanctions; Trump on the other hand counter-offered that Kim relinquishes his whole weapons-of-mass-destruction program in return for full sanctions relief.[4] The meeting ended with Trump walking away from the negotiations causing North Korea to stopped cooperating with both U.S and South Korea after the Summit. Under the current leadership of Joe Biden, the administration also faces the same problem – there is no clear opportunity for Biden to curtail North Korea’s nuclear weapon program where U.S diplomacy towards DPRK continues to be stuck in the mud.
[1] Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “North Korea’s Activities in Southeast Asia and the Implications for the Region,” Brookings, November 29, 2017.
[2] Dominique F. Fernandes, “Fire and Fury: ASEAN’s Role in Cooling U.S-North Korea Tensions,” The Diplomat, August 16, 2017.
[3] “ASEAN: The Reluctant ‘Middle-Man’ in the Inter-Korean Peace Process,” ASEAN Today, December 31, 2018.
[4] Simon Denyer & Anne Gearan, “North Korea Leader Offers to Dismantle Nuclear Test Site – But Only After U.S. Acts,” The Washington Post, September 20, 2018.
[Photo credit: internet]
